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held on November 2, 1988, Circuit Court Judge Sheila McCleve
bound defendant over for trial on December 1, 1988 (R. 2, 9).
Defendant was arraigned on December 9, 1988 before District Court
Judge Frank G. Noel and the case was set for trial on February 1,
1989 (R. 57, 172).
On December 19, 1988, defendant moved in the district
court to quash the circuit court bindover order on the grounds
that the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause
that defendant committed the crimes (R. 58-63).

In his

memorandum he noted that a transcript of the preliminary hearing
had been ordered for the district court's review (R. 61). On
February 23, 1989, Judge Noel denied the motion, stating that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at preliminary hearing (R. 99).
On March 8, 1989, defendant petitioned this Court for
permission to file an interlocutory appeal (R. 104-09).

This

Court granted interlocutory review on April 13, 1989 (R. 103).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
There are no additional facts other than those set
forth in the Statement of the Case, above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district courts do not have jurisdiction to review
the evidence supporting the bindover orders of circuit courts.
The statute previously providing the district courts with
appellate and supervisory authority over the circuit courts was
amended in 1986 and the authority was eliminated.

Defendant

should have filed an interlocutory appeal petition in this Court
directly from the circuit court order rather than filing a motion
to quash in the district court if he wished appellate review of
the bindover order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW THE ORDERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
Defendant characterized his action in the district
court as a motion to quash the bindover order.

He argues that he

was not seeking appellate review in the district court.
Nonetheless, regardless of defendant's characterization, what
defendant sought was review on the record from the circuit court
of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to that court.

He

requested the district court to reverse the order of the circuit
court based upon that review.

See Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Quash the Bindover at R. 61. This type of on-therecord review of the sufficiency of the evidence with the
requested relief being reversal of the order reviewed can be
nothing other than appellate review.

The district court ruled

that it lacked authority to review bindover orders of the circuit
court and denied the motion to quash.

This ruling was correct.

Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution
states:

"The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as

provided by statute."

This provision was adopted in 1985 and

markedly contrasts with its 1896 predecessor, which provided that
a district court has "appellate jurisdiction from all inferior
courts and tribunals, and supervisory control of the same."

Prior to 1986, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) provided:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law; appellate
jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the
same.
See 1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 50.

In 1986, the jurisdiction of

the district court was redefined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4
(Supp. 1989).

Subsection (1) states:

"The district court has

original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal . .
The only reference to appellate jurisdiction is in subsection
(5):

"The district court has jurisdiction to review agency

adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63 .
. .."

Thus, the district court has no authority to review the

orders of a circuit court under the only statute granting it
appellate authority.

This Court is vested with jurisdiction to

review the orders of circuit courts in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d) (Supp. 1989).

Accordingly, if defendant wished review of

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory appeal from
the circuit court order.
(Utah 1985).

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 270

As the Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code

Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) governs appeals from bindover
orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the right to
petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order.
Defendant cites State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah
1986), for the proposition that the district court has
jurisdiction to review bindover orders of the circuit court.

-4-

Defendant fails to note that the amendment of the statute
previously granting the district court appellate jurisdiction
over circuit courts, which limits its appellate jurisdiction to
agency adjudicative proceedings, occurred in 1986, The amendment
was effective July 1, 1986.

1986 Utah Laws ch. 47, § 82.

Brickey was decided on January 24, 1986, nearly 6 months prior to
the effective date of the amendment.

At that time, the statute

governing the district court's appellate jurisdiction did allow
the district court to exercise supervisory and appellate
authority over the circuit courts.
50.

See 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 47 §

The statute no longer vests such authority in the district

court and Brickey no longer applies.

To the extent that this

Court's statement in State v. Martinez, Case No. 860255-CA, slip
op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. filed Feb. 18, 1988), that Brickey
recognizes an appellate authority in the district court is
inconsistent with the district court's current statutory
authority, it should not be followed.
Defendant asserts that the district court has original
jurisdiction to hear the motion to quash a circuit court bindover
order.

Thus, he contends that the district court could review

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the preliminary
hearing.

This assertion relies upon defendant's
It is unclear what precedential value is attributed

to unpublished opinions, thus, the use of the phrase "should not
be followed."

If this Court believes that it would be more

appropriate to overrule Martinez on this point, then the State
requests the Court to do so.

mischaracterization of the review he sought as something other
than appellate review.

As stated more fully above, what

defendant sought from the district court was review of the
circuit court record and a determination by the district court
that the record was insufficient to support the order.
nothing other than appellate review.

This is

Section 78-3-4 and art.

VIII, § 5 both speak of original jurisdiction and appellate
jurisdiction as separate classes of jurisdiction.

Original

jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear matters
originally filed in that court, Appellate jurisdiction is the
authority of a court to review orders of other tribunals.

By

simply characterizing his motion as an original action in the
district court, defendant cannot transform appellate review into
something that is included in the district court's original
jurisdictional authority.

If this were possible, anyone could

characterize anything in a way in which they could obtain a
hearing in the court of their choice rather than in the court
that is designated to hear the matter.

C!f. DeBry v„ Salt Lake

County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App«
1988)(constitutional grant of general appellate jurisdiction does
not grant specific appellate jurisdiction where there is no
statutory appellate authority over the tribunal appealed from).
Defendant also refers to Utah R. Crim. P. 12 for the
district court's authority to quash bindovers.

Defendant

correctly states that the district court can dismiss a criminal
action where there are defects in the indictment or information;
however, he reads too much into the Rule 12 provision.
states:

Rule 12

(b) Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable
of determination without the trial of the
general issue may be raised prior to trial by
written motion. The following shall be
raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects
in the indictment or information other than
that it fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense, which
objection shall be noticed by the court at
any time during the pendency of the
proceeding; . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) (1982, repealed effective July 1,
1990).

Defendant's reliance on this rule is misplaced because he

was not objecting to any defects in the information.

Rather, he

objected to the order of the circuit court binding him over for
trial.

Rule 12(b)(1) governs objections to the information

itself and not objections to an order of the circuit court.

The

rule does not create an appellate authority in the district court
that otherwise does not exist.
In Point II of his brief, defendant argues that this
Court should place appellate review of bindover orders in the
hands of the district court in the interest of judicial economy.
Not only are defendant's arguments weak, but they encourage this
Court to make a policy decision that may only be made by the
Legislature.
Defendant asserts that the district court could more
quickly dispose of the issue of whether a bindover was supported
by sufficient evidence than could this Court.

He asserts that

Rule 12 governs such a review and that he is required to raise
the issue at least five days prior to trial. He argues,

-7-

therefore, that the district court would necessarily decide the
issue during the five days prior to trial and that this process
would be much faster than interlocutory review.
There are several flaws in defendant's scheme of
review.

First, defendant's assertion that the district court

would review the case much more quickly is not necessarily
accurate.
date —

Defendant's review scheme is attached to the trial

a date that, for many reasons, may be continued

repeatedly.

A criminal trial is rarely set so soon after a

bindover that a motion to quash based upon insufficient evidence
would be disposed of sooner than this Court could hear an
interlocutory appeal.

Under defendant's scheme, a defendant's

motion to quash could be filed five days prior to trial even if
the trial date was not scheduled until several months after the
preliminary hearing and bindover.
Further, by filing his request for review as a motion
to quash in the district court, defendant creates for himself the
ability to file an interlocutory appeal petition from an adverse
ruling of the district court.

Instead of creating a more

efficient system of review, defendant creates a system in which
he hopes to obtain two separate reviews of the same issue.
A timely interlocutory appeal petition, on the other
hand, is attached to the order appealed from.

A petition for

permission to appeal must be filed within 20 days from the order
appealed from.

See State v. Tiffany, Case no. 890595-CA (order

filed Jan. 4, 1990).

This date is much more predictable than one

which is tied to an uncertain trial date which is dependant upon
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court scheduling and any other proceedings that might be required
prior to trialf such as competency evaluations, motions to
suppress evidence, etc.
Second, defendant assumes that the district court could
review the record of the preliminary hearing during the five days
prior to trial.

This assumption is unrealistic and is certainly

not borne out by the facts of this case.

Because the district

court's primary function is to hear trials, it would be required
to fit the review of a bindover order into its already
overcrowded trial schedule.

The court might be required to read

several volumes of transcript from the preliminary hearing to
properly evaluate a defendant's claim of insufficient evidence.
In fact, defendant here requested the court to review the
transcript of the preliminary hearing (R. 61). Such a review
requires time, thus, a five-day expectation is impractical.
Third, defendant asserts that this Court's review
process would be even further delayed because this Court must
determine whether to accept the appeal and then the case would
follow the normal schedule for preparation of transcripts and
briefing which he asserts is too lengthy.
exists, is easily rectified.

This problem, if it

This Court could treat criminal

interlocutory appeals with expedition and could require the
parties to adhere to an expedited briefing schedule.

This Court

need not grant extensions for preparation of briefs.
Moreover, defendant cannot seriously be suggesting that
the preparation of transcripts for this Court's review would
require any more time than would the preparation of transcripts

_Q_

for the district court's review.

Nor can he seriously be

suggesting that a district court could review the sufficiency of
the evidence presented to another court without reviewing the
record that was created in that court.

This Court's primary

function is appellate review of the records created in lower
courts.

This Court is well-equipped to perform that function.

There is no need for a criminal trial to be delayed by this Court
any longer than it would be delayed by the district court for
consideration of the same issue.
Even though defendant asserts that this Court is unable
to review the bindover order as skillfully as the district court,
this Court is well-equipped to review the sufficiency of the
evidence that has been presented to a lower tribunal.

Indeed,

this Court is frequently called upon to review the sufficiency of
the evidence in criminal cases.

Defendant's assertion that the

trial court is better able to review fact intensive issues misses
the mark because this assertion would only be valid if the
district court heard additional evidence.

Of course, neither the

State nor the defendant could claim that a circuit court order
should stand or fall based upon evidence that was not presented
to the circuit court.

Thus, defendant's argument is baseless.

Finally, even if this Court thought that policy
considerations dictated that the district court is the
appropriate forum for appellate review of circuit court bindover
orders, this Court has no authority to place jurisdiction in the
district court.

Article VIII, § 5 authorizes the district courts

to exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.

There

is no statutory authority for district courts to review the
orders of circuit courts.

For this reason,

the district court

correctly denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover order,
and this Court should affirm the district court's order.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion
to quash the circuit court order binding him over for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 /

day of January,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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